The emergence of axiology as a key parameter in modern linguistics

A review of significant contributions from the 1950s to the 1980s

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This article intends to provide a summarized historical survey of some relevant contributions to axiological semantics from linguists included in the two most influential linguistic traditions from the 50s to the late 70s: structural linguistics and transformational-generative grammar. In fact, even if their representative opinions at that time could now be regarded as incidental, it would be unfair to pretend that some of their intuitions and principles have not been crucial in illuminating essential aspects of the parameter of axiological evaluation in modern linguistics. In this respect, it is worth highlighting the ideas disseminated by key figures of the Saussurean or Chomskyan traditions from the perspective given by half a century of evolution in the field. For that purpose contributions are included from authors such as Apresjan, Bally, Coseriu, Duchaček, Fodor, Grzegorek, Guiraud, Katz, Klima, Pottier, Stati, or Ullmann, among others.

Key words: Axiology, Axiological linguistics, valuation, structuralism, transformational-generative grammar

1. Introduction

Through the centuries, scholars from diverse philosophical schools have been seriously concerned about the questions of value and axiology. They proposed lists and groups of values for various purposes (see, for instance, the classifications provided by Max Scheler (1913-16) or José Ortega y Gasset (1923) [phenomenological approach], René Le Senne (1942) or Louis Lavelle (1950-55) [Realist trend] or Rokeach (1973) [psycho-social perspective], to mention just a few). However, in the mid-XXth century, lexical semantics was dominated by logic, or, more strictly, that aspect of logic which deals with values of truth. The Saussurean and Chomskyan traditions in linguistics usually remained silent about other aspects that should also be considered as relevant to the semantics of natural languages, such as various axiological distinctions between “good” and “bad” or “ugly” and “beautiful”. Consequently, a systematic and consistent introduction of the axiological parameter in natural languages has been missing for

Before the final third of the XXth century, there were sporadic contributions to this issue, frequently in connection with connotation and referred to as “emotive” aspects of meaning. Most scientific production in that period considered values as simple “overtones” and as subsidiary references dependent on non-axiological categories or pursuing absolutely different theoretical goals. That is the case of countless linguists included in the structuralist / generative traditions mentioned above. However, a minority of linguists from these dominant linguistic schools indirectly paved the way for further developments in other functionalist approaches during the following 20 to 30 years, such as the case of the Appraisal Framework stemming from systemic grammar and which will be broadly dealt within this volume.

2. The axiological parameter in the structuralist tradition

Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum’s research (1957) and their concept of “semantic differential” demonstrated that values could perform a dominant function in the structure of concepts (see also Osgood 1980). Research has shown that emotions are among the major factors determining information processing rather than merely modifying it (Suchecki 1983). This fundamental finding of cognitive psychology was apparently ignored by previous generations of linguists (Krzeszowski 1997). Linguists from the Saussurean tradition, for instance, made some formal statements about the central, even denotative role played by the axiological component in numerous lexical units of natural languages, even if it is a fact that no specific theory was formulated during that period.

2.1 French-speaking structuralist linguists

One of the early XXth century figures who placed axiology at the core of the linguistic debate was the Swiss linguist Charles Bally, who intuited the vital, over-riding role played by the human ability to valuate (positively or negatively), not only for the preservation of mankind, but also for language formation. At least, this is what can be deduced from his own words:

Notre pensée surajoute spontanément aux moindres perceptions une “idée de valeur”, c.à.d. qu’un obscur instinct de conservation rapporte tout à notre moi, à notre vie, à notre bien-être. Le premier résultat de cette infirmité est que nos perceptions s’accompagnent de sentiments de plaisir ou de déplaisir; les choses nous affectent agréablement ou désagréablement; elles se divisent en choses dont nous jouissons et en choses dont nous souffrions. Quand l’instinct de conservation écoute mieux l’intelligence, il trie les impressions selon la formule de l’utile: “Ceci est bon, ceci est mauvais”; enfin, quand l’instinct de conservation imagine de placer en dehors du moi les normes du jugement d’utilité (principes de morale ou dogmes religieux), il adopte une formule plus haute et dit: “Ceci est bien, ceci est mal”. Ce triage, inhérent à notre nature, nécessaire à notre conservation, comment pourrait-il ne pas se refléter dans le langage? (Bally 1909, 3rd ed. 1951:152-53)

He also brought out the necessary and close relationship between value judgments and
the expression of linguistic emotion or affection when he said that “(…) value judgments differ from the logical ones because, to some extent, they are always emotional: they are never entirely intellectual products” (Bally 1913, 5th ed. in Spanish 1967:42-43) [Translated from the Spanish edition].

Bally finally perceived the axiological parameter as a kind of subtle phenomenon that permeates (connotes) most linguistic expressions, but it can also appear undisguisedly (denotation) by means of a series of linguistic elements that fulfil a special function. That is what can be inferred from his words:

(...) Il y a, comme disent les grammairiens, des expressions péjoratives, et d`autres mélioratives (qu`on me pardonne le néologisme); ou bien elles rendront essentiellement la notion “Ceci est bien” ou au contraire elles exprimeront qu`une chose est mal; il y aura des expressions essentiellement laudatives ou essentiellement dépréciatives. (…) [- Cette-] tendence existe, et qu`elle soit toujours prête à exercer son action, qu`elle se manifeste dans une foule de faits de langage, qu`on ait même le droit de dire que tous sont en puissance d`expression péjorative ou méliorative, voilà ce qu`il nous importait de faire comprendre. (Bally 1909, 3rd ed., 1951:153)

Structural semantics were deeply rooted in Europe, particularly in France and Germany in the mid-century. French linguists have dealt with the integration of subjectivity and axiology in the lexicon, even if they did not put forth a specific theory. Georges Matoré (1953: 82), for instance, compiled the notional field “d` ART et de TECHNIQUE vers 1765”, which was more of a sociological than a linguistic work and using a questionable methodology. However, he combined various axiological divisions and dimensions among the terms selected: “C) Les moyens: I.- La raison et les Lumières. II.- Le Sentiment. III.- Les sensations. IV.- La socialité. V.- La vertu”. Apart from this impressionistic perspective of Matoré, this notional field presented an accurate view of the tremendous influence that social matters exerted on axiological dimensions such as sensations, feelings, attitudes or conduct.

Two years later, Pierre Guiraud was one of the few French-speaking linguists who rebelled against the Saussurean interpretation of value or valeur:

Le sens de base et le sens contextuel ne se superposent pas; il y a toujours un seul sens dans une situation donnée, le sens contextuel; au mot dans son contexte correspond une seule image conceptuelle. Mais il se forme en même temps d`autres associations extra-notionelles qui sans altérer le concept le colorent. (...) nous les appelons valeurs par opposition au sens; les valeurs sont des associations extra-sémantiques. (Guiraud 1955: 31/36)

For him, however, these valeurs may be of two types and will come closer to what has traditionally been understood as connotation (“valeurs expressives”) or stylistic register (“valeurs sociales ou socio-contextuelles”). Despite the distance between this view and that of Bally, Ullmann, and others, who establish a clear distinction between exclusively or predominantly evaluative terms on the one hand and occasional evaluative terms, on the other, Guiraud (ibid.: 32) becomes aware that these words and phrases “(...) qui expriment les émotions, les désirs, les intentions, les jugements de celui qui parle ...”. Even if their evaluative meaning is not part of the “core meaning”, they are at least “(...) étroitement liées au procès sémantique dont elles constituent un des facteurs essentiels”. That is, its influence on the “core” meaning is constant and decisive.

Towards the end of the 50s, Georges Gougenheim (1958:3-15) referred back to the Bally’s distinction between “laudatifs” and “dépréciatifs” terms. However, this
author wrongly considered the axiological load of words as an additional stylistic register which depended exclusively on the speaker’s subjective opinion, ignoring the fact that that if a French speaker says words such as “parcimonieux”, “bavard”, “douceâtre”, “vétillieux”, etc., the negative load is already included in the features of meaning (semic formulas) of the words. That is how it is understood by the French-speaking community regardless of the context.

In 1974, one of the greatest figures of structural semantics, Bernard Pottier, also paved the way for a remarkable proposal. This was the consideration of the axiological factor as a specific modality that could be included among the key linguistic-conceptual notions (mostly noemics) as well as among the main semantico-grammatical categories (tense, aspect, modality, etc.), but having a special characteristic: under certain circumstances it could exert considerable influence on the other modalities (epistemic, factitive, deontic, etc.). This can be initially inferred from the following classification of modal axes subclasses, particularly the “appréciation” in the second column or “vision constative”:

b) Voici quelques sous-classes des axes modaux:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I: Vision prospective</th>
<th>II: Vision constative</th>
<th>III: Vision factitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPULSION</td>
<td>SENSATION</td>
<td>PERMISSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(je veux, je dois)</td>
<td>(je crois, je vois)</td>
<td>(je laisse, je permets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÉVENTUALITÉ</td>
<td>DÉCLARATION</td>
<td>CAUSATIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(il se peut, il est probable)</td>
<td>(je dis, je promets)</td>
<td>(je fais, je rends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPRÉCIATION</td>
<td>DELIBÉRATIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(il est dommage, il est bon)</td>
<td>(je nomme, je declare)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Pottier 1974: 160)

2.2 Structuralist linguists from other origins

In 1960 the Czech Otto Ducháček wrote one of the most ambitious works on synchronic semantics for the French language: *Le champs conceptuel de la beauté en français moderne*. As the title clearly shows, it refers to aesthetics, the second member of the medieval axiological triad (*bonum, pulchrum, verum*). Although his research has been harshly criticized for serious methodological and organizational shortcomings, we should not ignore the brilliant contribution to a linguistic axiological theory that otherwise would have gone unnoticed. The Czech linguist stated explicitly the extensive or prototypical nature of the axiologically-loaded lexical dimensions, anticipating in a certain way what cognitive linguists are claiming today:

Le champ de la beauté -ainsi que tous ceux qui jouent un certain rôle dans le discours affectif- possède une considérable force expansive et, en même temps, une grande force attractive. (Ducháček, 1960: 180)

Originairement, nous semble-t-il, l’idée de beauté se rapportait aux perceptions visuelles et très tôt aussi à celle de l’ouïe. Comme on qualifiait de beau ce qui plaisait, les expressions de beauté pouvaient passer des domaines de la vue et de l’ouïe dans d’autres, surtout dans ceux de l’esprit (où beau devient synonyme de “brillant”, “exquis” et “élevé” et joli désigne ce qui est agréablement imaginé, plaisant, amusant
In 1962, the British author Stephen Ullmann referred in his work called *Semantics* to the twofold distinction that inspired in part the generally accepted distinction between axiological connotation and axiological denotation. For him, some words contain an evaluative feature overlapping their core meaning. For instance, *a hovel* is a small hut, especially one that is dirty or needs a lot of repair, while *to scrawl* is to write something quickly, without trying to make your writing tidy or easy to read. He also claims that there are words whose main function is to express a value judgment or make an emotive comment. That is the case of adjectives such as *good, brave, funny, stupid, horrible* and their antonyms. The emotive element here is not only a layer that permeates meaning, but is a central part of it.

In 1966, the Russian linguist Jurij Apresjan in his article “Analyse distributionnelle des significations et champs sémantiques structures” advocated that lexical fields should be integrated into semantics following strict linguistic criteria (in association with phonology, morphology or syntax) rather than conceptual ones, based on logic. To achieve that, he proposed the distributional analysis method (rejected by Apresjan himself at a later stage). He intended to show how the meaning of a word can be deduced from its phrasal distribution with a specific formula:

Il est indispensable de associer à chaque sens une formule spécifique de distribution. Il se révèle que tous les éléments de base de la signification, y compris sa caractéristique stylistique et émotionnelle, trouvent un reflet suffisant dans leur distribution, c`est-à-dire dans les modèles structuraux et dans leur aptitude de combinaison. (Apresjan, 1966: 52)

Precisely, to demonstrate such a link he used, among other examples, the adjective *good* in predicative position, which can indirectly be seen as partial evidence to endorse the plurality of axiological divisions (positive pole) arising from this evaluative hypernym:

1. Bon: not to be + good. He (the dog, the idea) is good.
2. Bienveillant: P + to be + good + to + P. He is good to you.
3. Aimable: It / that + to be + good + of + P. It’s good of you.
4. Utile: C + to be + good + for + P. Apples are good for you.
5. habile: P + to be + good + at + C. He is good at counting.

(Apresjan, 1966: 57)

All examples that fit into pattern number 2 will always refer to an ethical or moral content, be it positive or negative. That would be the case of adjectives such as *cruel, just, kind, merciless*, etc. Obviously, this distributionalist proposal has many shortcomings but at least proves certain semantic syntactic interfaces with combinatorial validity. This might contribute to disambiguate cases of polysemy.

In the same decade, the development of structural semantics and its new terminology gave rise to a new discipline basically sketched by Eugenio Coseriu in 1968: *Classematics*. The head of the Tübingen school was the first to raise the issue of an evaluation classeme affecting a large amount of adjectives:

(...)

1 In the Functional Lexematic Model (FLM) designed by Martin Mingorance (1987, 1990, 1995) Coseriu’s structural semantics theory and the principles of classematics are integrated in the Functional Grammar of Simon C. Dik to help develop the lexicon component.
combinations as It. “bello e buono” [noble and handsome], “grande e grosso” [big and tall], “piccolo e brutto” [small and ugly], etc., (adjectives which belong, in each case, to the same class), or adversative combinations as Sp. “pobre pero honrado” [poor but honest] It. “povero ma onesto” (adjectives which belong to different classes) (...). [Translated from Spanish] (Coseriu 1968, Spanish ed. 1977:176)

Unfortunately he only referred to adjectives, being obvious that this type of classeme would affect other open lexical classes, like verbs or nouns (Felices-Lago 1997b, 2003).

Coseriu's follower Horst Geckeler applied the lexematic theory to the synchronic analysis of the lexical field of the adjectives structuring the semantic area “age” in present-day French, wisely including what he called “(...) a specific dimension, which can be characterized as 'evaluative appreciation’” [Translated from Spanish] (Geckeler 1971, Spanish ed. 1976:315), in connection with the criterion to distinguish vieux/vieille from âgé (referred to the class: person) according to the “evaluative” semes “respectful” or “non-respectful” and wisely concluding that “(...) it has to be clear that this is an element of denotative meaning and should not be considered as connotative, because it refers to the functional oppositions level” [Translated from Spanish] (Geckeler 1971, Spanish ed. 1976: 315). He proves the above statement by providing the following example (originally in French): “Le timbre-poste a augmenté de cinq centimes, la retraite des vieux, pardon: ‘l”allocation aux personnes agées’, de dix mille francs” (Geckeler 1971, Spanish ed. 1976:315).

Only a year earlier, the Spanish Ramón Trujillo (1970:491) also referred to “a social-ethical evaluation, divided into positive and negative ...”, involving a permanent sign (+), (-) or (+/-) in the boxes for each one of the lexical units analysed in his work entitled: El campo semántico de la valoración intelectual en español. (“The semantic field of intellectual evaluation in Spanish”), which is based on a diachronic study of the field. Not surprisingly, this is a comprehensive lexematic study, founded mainly on the principles disclosed by Eugenio Coseriu and applied to one of the major axiological areas, the noetic division. Nevertheless, despite the importance given by Trujillo to this axiological division at empirical level, in his theoretical postulates he claims that intellectual evaluation only represents an extra-linguistic fact of experience.

The lexical field of human locomotion verbs in German, organized by the German linguist Gerd Wotjak (1971, ed. Spanish 1979:464), also includes a box entitled Emotion as an influential meaning label in the corpus analysis. Given the nature of the verbs studied, it does not refer to axiological components in the same sense as previous authors, but integrates in his field emotional and affective features that permeate meaning and have been traditionally neglected.

As far as we know, in 1979 the Romanian semanticist Sorin Stati compiled the most complete intuitive classification of axiological lexical units in modern linguistics (using adjectives from French and other Romance languages), but he lacked an intensive inductive study of the vocabulary, according to its hierarchical paradigmatic and syntagmatic arrangement. He also missed the opportunity of applying an analytic model that “might have adequately combined semantic, syntactic and pragmatic

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information attached to each affected lexical unit in his sémantique des adjectifs. Unfortunately, the final result of his classification looks more like an ordinary thesaurus than a necessary scientific approach to the analysis of lexical units or dimensions.

To conclude this descriptive approach, some interesting conclusions by the British semanticist Rosemary Sansome (1986) must be included. In her article, entitled “Connotation and Lexical Field Analysis” she sought to demonstrate that it was feasible to describe the “non-cognitive” aspects of lexical meaning within the broader frame of contrastive analyses of lexical fields. In this study, the “lexical connotations” are properties of the lexical unit itself, not of the referent, and are based on comparisons between lexical units that belong to the same lexical field. This means that they have very similar “denotative” contents. If, for example, “denotator” and “connotator” merge into one lexical unit, then the author sets up eight subcategories, including the axiological or evaluative subcategory (“axiological or evaluative”) as well as others, which would correspond to the diastatic, diaphasic and diatopic distinctions described by Eugenio Coseriu (see Coseriu 1967).

In developing lexical microfields to prove her assumptions, an intensification scale (-3 → +3) is attributed to the “axiological subcategory” that shows the level of positivity or negativity elicited with the term selected among users of English (according to tests applied to informants). For example, if, in the same microfield, we compare synonymous verbs such as: “Act1 and Act2 live as husband and wife”, “live together / with” and “cohabit”, we can conclude that they are axiologically neutral, whereas “live in sin” is valued negatively by a majority of respondents with the level (-1) and “shack up” with (-3). Despite the differences in the value judgments of informants, because of their differences in gender, age, education, etc., it is clear that the negative axiological load of the lexical units selected does not reside in the referent (the fact of living together as husband and wife), but in the lexical unit proper. For example, “shack up” incorporates the disqualification and rejection of that situation by a large group of people in a linguistic community for social or cultural reasons. If this rejection becomes or not a permanent functional trait will inevitably be a controversial issue. In my opinion, if a majority of speakers consider a particular concept as negative, “shack up” for example, then it is clear from the synchronic perspective of contemporary English that negativity in this case is an intersubjective fact and is also part of the meaning of the unit. Therefore, it should be regarded as a permanent feature of the language and we cannot refer to a case of connotation, despite the fact that, over the years, this negative perception may change or disappear with social evolution and shifts in values.

3. The axiological parameter in the transformational-generative tradition

T. P. Krzeszowski (1990:136) is the first linguist who reported the surprising fact that the transformational-generative tradition as a whole remained almost completely silent on the issues related to values and their involvement in the structure of natural languages. Such concepts as connotative or affective meaning, not to mention axiology, are absent from the classic writings of tradition, notably Weinreich (1966), Bendix (1971), Katz (1972), Bierwisch (1971), and, particularly, from Bever, Katz and Langendoen (1976).

Although Krzeszowski minimizes the contributitions of writers such as S. Klima
(1964), or P. Kiparsky & C. Kiparsky (1970)³, he highlights the ideas of R. Kalisz in his 1981 monograph. In Krzeszowski’s opinion, Kalisz’s work is the first study in which the “positive-negative” (p-n) scale is used as relevant to subcategorizing English and Polish verbs. English sentential that-complements are analysed and compared with the equivalent Polish sentential że-complements. Employing the p-n scale allows Kalisz to dispose of the presuppositional account. In his own words (Kalisz 1981: 79): “(...) the question whether the truth of the complement is presupposed or not becomes irrelevant”. Kalisz’s insightful study is very significant primarily because it extends the scope of linguistic semantics beyond the traditional boundaries delimited by the truth-conditional logic. It also introduces the concept of scale, and hence highlights the graded rather than binary character differences between various predicates. The “positive-negative” scale, which Kalisz used in his description of English and Polish predicates, is the most general of all scales and, as will be shown presently, it turns out to be relevant in describing many other linguistic phenomena.

However, in my opinion, other relevant and valuable contributions should have been taken into account by the Polish linguist. This is the case of the seminal articles of J. J. Katz & J. A. Fodor (1964), J. J. Katz (1964a), and most notably J. J. Katz (1964b).

3.1 The axiological component and the meaning of good in the semantic theory of Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor

Interpretive semantics is the set of principles that Katz and Fodor postulated and discussed in his 1964 article “The Structure of a Semantic Theory”⁴. This theory proposes the integration of semantics in the framework of a transformational grammar. As is well known, the semantic component operates on the deep structure, where all the semantic information is contained. This structure also has a “dictionary” and “projection rules”. The dictionary contains a matrix of phonological and syntactic features for each “lexical entry”, and for each lexical meaning it contains various “readings” representing its meaning through semantic features in a given molecular structure.⁵ It also contains the “path” with its “selection restrictions”, which serve to determine the combinations with which a lexical entry can operate and the senses that are activated (updated).

In order to explain how to represent the path of a lexical entry (adjectival modifier) that is compatible with the path of another entry (nominal head), the two authors use an occurrence of the adjective honest:

\[
\text{honest} \rightarrow \text{Adjective} \rightarrow (\text{Evaluative}) \rightarrow (\text{Moral}) \rightarrow [\text{Innocent of illicit sexual intercourse}] [(\text{Human}) \text{ and } (\text{Female})].
\]

This is to be construed as saying that an adjectival occurrence of honest receives the interpretation, (Evaluative) →

³ It is worth noting Kiparsky’s description of “emotives”, which take emotive complements. Such complements express the speaker’s subjective, emotional or evaluative reactions.
⁴ It was published for the first time in Language, 39, 2 (April-June, 1963), pp. 170-210. However, I have consulted a version that was published one year later in the volume The Structure of Language, by J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (eds.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964, pp. 479-518. I have also included in the analysis other ideas developed by Katz in the article «Analicity and Contradiction in Natural Languages» and published in the volume quoted above.
⁵ In this respect, “semantic markers”, could be considered similar to the classemes in Coseriu’s lexematic theory. For the same reason, the “distinguishers” could be equated to the semes in the structural semantics theory.
As can be seen, (Evaluative) is explicitly included as a semantic marker whose meaning is inherent to his and other readings of honest. The two linguists also give another example of the semantic marker (Evaluative) in the description of the following path for the adjective colorful (Katz & Fodor, ibid: 527) compatible with the head of a famous novel: “→ adjective → (Evaluative) → [Of distinctive character, vividness, or picturesqueness] <(Aesthetic Object) v (Social Activity)” as “P42 is the sense in No novel is less colorful than Middlemarch, excepting Silas Marner”.

Going back to the original example of honest, another semantic marker (Moral) is specified under the same conditions as above. The theoretical and practical consequences of the inclusion of the two axiologically-loaded semantic markers are very important. First, it would mean the explicit recognition of the axiological component as an integral part in the description of lexical items sensitive to this marker and the need for a formal description of this type of information in the “readings” or semic formulas integrated into models of semantic description of (lexicographical) or lexical entries. Moreover, although the hierarchical relationship between (Evaluative) and (Moral) is not explained in this case, the order in which they have been formulated is a clear sign, as well as the inclusion of an “axiological” path based on ethics or morality.

Evidence of linguistic and philosophical concerns of Jerrold J. Katz for axiological issues was his article “Semantic Theory and the Meaning of ‘Good’”, published a year after the interpretive semantic theory. It aims not only to describe and defend again the foundations of his previous theory, but also to raise the most relevant questions about the meaning of good and provide a formulation of this meaning in the context of his semantic theory. At the same time, he intends to explain why other semantic theories cannot reasonably explain well the meaning of such an important philosophical concept. He rejects, among others, the validity of contributions such as those of Carnap (1947), Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum (1957), B. F. Skinner (1957) or Zeno Vendler (1963). According to Katz, the key to a correct treatment of the problem is initiated by the introduction of a lexical entry for good in the “dictionary” that is considered acceptable (in the sense that this entry becomes a basis for projecting the meanings of an infinite set of sentences or phrases combining with good).

Without referring to the syntactic aspects of good, difficulties arise when we deal with “reading” combinations including good and the nominal head that is modified. The first obstacle lies in determining what nouns combine with the adjective good and do not produce anomalous interpretations. For that purpose, the American linguist and philosopher sets up two basic categories, the first one brings together combinations which are compatible, and the second all the others; for example (Katz 1964b: 750): “knife’, ‘anesthetic’, ‘money’, ‘razor blade’, ‘torture’, ‘citizen’,” etc., would be placed in the first category and “‘liquid’, ‘electricity’, ‘planet’, ‘molecule’”, etc., in the second. The criterion for differentiating the two groups consists of the introduction of an “evaluation semantic marker” into the lexical “readings” of nouns in the first group. The inclusion or exclusion of this marker indicates: “whether or not things covered by the meaning of the noun are evaluatable in terms of good or bad” (ibid 1964b: 751). But as nouns whose meaning is represented in a “reading” containing this semantic marker may also possess other totally different meaning components, a full lexical “reading” of knife, for example, would be (ibid. 1964b: 751): “(...) → Noun, Common Noun, ...,
Count Noun; (Physical Object), (Non-living), (Blade), (Handle), (Eval: (ease of dividing substances softer than its blade)); <SR>“.

Moreover, the author’s claim is remarkable in favour of the existence of words whose “readings” contain only evaluative semantic markers, even if the example offered above is questionable. Another “fuzzy” example is: anaesthetic (ibid. 1964b: 752): “(Eval: (Effective in producing a temporary loss of feeling in a part of a body))”. In my view, the “effectivity” of producing a “temporary loss of feeling” is not a permanent feature in this “reading”, but a subjective individual opinion.

Katz does not ignore in his work the double facet of the axiological component, since he provides for the existence of a lexical “reading” for bad in the same circumstances as the antonym good, simply by replacing (+) for (-). However, the most decisive contribution of Katz to this topic is based on his statement: “(...) The Meaning of ‘good’ is syncategorematic” (ibid: 761). Therefore, we can infer that the individual characterization of word meanings and expressions is not feasible in the case of the meaning of good, because that meaning is more of a function that operates upon other meanings than an independent attribute. In this respect, the contribution of this American linguist is different from other semantic theories.

To conclude, it can be claimed that Katz makes a significant contribution to this topic but he confused three key aspects: (i) conceptual (non-linguistic) meaning and linguistic meaning, (ii) language use and language meaning (iii) language and speech. That explains why the evaluative component is not always included in the appropriate “reading” of certain nouns. That is the case of knife, an axiologically neutral noun. Arbitrary decisions are based on a mere interpretation of lexicographic definitions of the term. If a knife can be defined as “that ability to cut materials that are softer than its blade” has nothing to do with the functional-pragmatic axiological category. If the usual function of a knife is considered to be positive or not by certain speakers in specific circumstances is something irrelevant for a generally accepted definition of the term.

3. 2 The heterogeneous contributions of Edward S. Klima and Maria L. Grzegorek

In describing the functioning and structures of negation in English, Edward S. Klima (1964: 313) refers to the presence of “(...) a common grammatical-semantic feature to be referred to as Affect(ive)” whose syntactic consequences are found, for example, when (ibid., 313) “(...) in presentential position, morphemes containing that feature motivate inversion”. However, where the presence of the Affective feature is more obvious is in predicates that contain adjectives like stupid, ashamed, surprised, reluctant, etc., because they not only express the subjective, emotional (even evaluative) reaction of the speaker, but also cause the appearance of indefinites, as can be seen in the following examples given by the author.

I am surprised that he ever speaks to her (210a)
He was ashamed to take any more money (211a)
He was stupid to become any heavier (212a)
He was reluctant to see any more patients (213a)
(Klima 1964: 314)

Although it is true that Klima maintains there are words with a negative affix among the words that contain the feature Affect, his study refers to a limited number of predicates
in English, therefore the scope of the results is limited. As T. P. Krzeszowski (1990:137) points out, this American linguist does not even raise the question of an axiological scale that, in my view, is one of the substantial theoretical aspects of the problem.

The Polish linguist Maria L. Grzegorek (1980), strongly influenced by the semantic theory of J. J. Katz & J. A. Fodor, came up with some new ideas on the role of the axiological component in the semantic representation of any lexical unit. The essential part of her contribution is developed in her (English-Polish) contrastive study entitled: “A Note on Semantic Representation of Lexical Items and Lexical Gaps” (1980: 293-307).

In the aforementioned work she first describes how two lexical units (“to smell bad”) may be the natural and logical paraphrase of a third one (“to stink”), and consequently she maintains that the representation of the verb stink consists of two semantic markers “PROPERTY” and “EVALUATION” as follows (ibid.: 294): “stink ((Property of X) (type: perceptual) (organ: nose), ((Evaluation of that property) (criterion: esthetical) (result: negative)).”

The most notable thing about this representation is not only increasing “evaluation” to the category of semantic marker (something which was already previously defended by J. J. Katz), but in explicitly incorporating the evaluative canon. That is to say, upon inserting “(criterion: aesthetic)” the transcendence of this implicit norm is recognized and, in consequence, this norm is fulfilled or transgressed (according to the case) and according to which we determine that stink will always be perceived as axiologically negative by the community of English speakers.

This supposes taking a very important step in the recognition of the relevancy that these canons possess for the meaning of a large number of lexical units and also for understanding why we judge things as positive or negative. Even after estimating the theoretical importance of the recognition of the axiological canon, the example selected, on the other hand, is not very good. It is evident that the criterion that governs the negativity of stink would be sensitive (hedonic unpleasantness) rather than aesthetic. In any case, a combination of both would be more appropriate, since what displeases the senses is perceived as aesthetically and socially improper.

That said, upon testing the conditions of semantic collocation the author offers a possible methodology for distinguishing a given axiological canon (in this case, the sense of taste against the sense of smell) according to the nature of the estimated reference. For instance, the priority evaluation of a food product like “soup” in the statement “The soup is good” is based more on the flavour than on the smell, unless it is specified otherwise. Consequently, “The soup is good” would be generally interpreted as “The soup tastes good”, and not as “The soup smells good”. Similarly, the measure of a perfume will always firstly be the smell (and not other senses): “This is good perfume = This perfume smells good”.

Grzegorek also makes reference to various English-Polish contrastive examples about the degree of intensity of a quality as a criterion (though it will not always be sufficient) for differentiating quasi-synonyms with the same level of axiological denotation, e.g.: the emotion of anger and the sensation of displeasure combined with the antiaesthetic perception (ibid.: 297): “gniew (anger); wściekłość (rage); furia (fury) [...] brzydki (ugly); szpetny (hideous); szkaradny (execrable)”.

This author claims in a definitive way the relevancy of the axiological component as the denotative element in wide lexical areas. This can be proven through the configuration that is carried out on the following lexical sub-area:
**Semantic field:** sensual data. **Subfields:** sensual data of smell and taste. **Relevant sememe:** Esthetical Evaluation

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SMELL</th>
<th>TASTE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Paraphrase</td>
<td>Lexical Item</td>
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<tr>
<td>laudatory</td>
<td>a good smell</td>
<td>scent aroma fragrance</td>
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<tr>
<td>esthetical</td>
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<tr>
<td>evaluation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disapproval</td>
<td>a bad smell</td>
<td>stench odour fetor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>esthetical</td>
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<tr>
<td>evaluation</td>
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(Grzegorek 1980: 303).

Here it can be seen how these lexical units not only include axiologically-loaded units, but also lexical units that define a non-axiological content, but where the axiological charge cannot be separated from the core meaning of the unit and is to some extent part of it.

**Conclusions**

The widespread idea that the Saussurean and Chomskyan traditions in modern linguistics have almost completely ignored the various axiological distinctions between “good” and “bad”, “ugly” and “beautiful”, etc. is not entirely true. The truth is that over half a century (from the 30s to the 80s of the XXth century) no consistent theory has been conceived to link the lucid contributions of philosophical axiology of the early XXth century with at least one of the two dominant linguistic paradigms under scrutiny in this study. It is obvious that valuations permeate human cognitive processes and human thinking and, consequently, there exists an inseparable link between language and values. The problem is that the possible impact that values have on the structure and function of language is not at all obvious and easy to grasp. However, updated and widely accepted contributions to axiological linguistics from the cognitive linguistics (Lakoffian cognitive semantics) or the systemic grammar traditions (appraisal framework) might recognise and confirm seminal principles in the often unconnected and scattered ideas of the group of linguists included in this work.

Consequently, the examples and cases collected in this study show consistent evidence that evaluation (positive or negative) is a permanent component in the definitional structure of many lexical units and is often specified in a more or less systematic way. Similarly, syntactic changes in sentences, clauses and phrases may also be motivated by the introduction of axiologically-loaded verbs, nouns or adjectives. Other contributions have shown that: (i) axiologically-loaded terms should result from intersubjectively uniform valuations of language users rather than from objective measurements of individual intuitions; (ii) emotional features in lexical units should also be considered as different from axiological features, even if both elements frequently overlap; and finally, (iii) some authors had intuited the canonical and multidimensional nature of the axiological phenomenon in the structure of language.
Acknowledgements

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